Torus

Build a website and host it as a Tor onion service from your own Windows PC or Android phone. No server, no domain, no account.

What you can make

Start from a ready-made site and change it in the editor:

Video site: uploads of up to 10 GB, each one re-encoded before anyone can watch it, so it carries no traces of the camera or app that made it. Board and microblog: posts, feeds and view counts. Wiki and pastebin.

Sites can have member accounts, with moderation (blocked words, approving new accounts) and picture puzzles to keep bots out. A Monero wallet kept in the vault lets a site take payments: each site gets an account of its own and each of its users gets a separate address, so nobody looking at the chain can link them.

Pages are plain HTML and CSS, with no scripts and no third-party requests. A built-in checker refuses to publish a page that would leak.

You can also mine a vanity onion address that starts with letters you choose. How it keeps you safe

Everything is in one encrypted vault. Sites, keys, visitor data and the wallet are encrypted with Argon2id and XChaCha20-Poly1305. Nothing is readable on disk without your passphrase. The network-facing part is sandboxed. Each site runs in its own host process that gets finished pages and its one onion key, and nothing else: never the vault, your passphrase or other sites. On Windows it runs in an AppContainer. On Linux and Android it runs under Landlock and seccomp. Visitors' submissions are sealed. What visitors send to a sealed collection is encrypted to a key that only the vault holds, using a hybrid of a classical and a post-quantum key agreement. Someone who seizes or breaks into the host can't read it. Tor runs inside the app (Arti), so there's no listening socket at all. Tor's own state is kept encrypted too. Nothing about your machine reaches visitors. Responses carry a small, fixed set of headers, with no clocks, software versions or file times. Under pressure: auto-lock, a panic action, and a decoy passphrase that opens a separate, empty vault. Backups: encrypted backup and restore of everything, or export and import of a single site.

Known limits

A backup doesn't need the phone's security chip: whoever has the file can guess passwords offline as fast as their hardware allows. Use a long, unique backup password, and keep the file somewhere safe. Enclave hasn't been audited by an independent security firm. If being found out could put you in danger, don't rely on it alone. A backup of the raw vault only works on the same phone, because it's bound to that phone's hardware key. Uninstalling Enclave or resetting the phone destroys the vault. The containers' total size is visible: it's a rough upper bound on how much is stored. A decoy made before containers keeps its own directory, which shows a second vault exists. Remove it and add a new decoy to move it inside the containers. On flash storage the controller can keep old copies of blocks that no app can reach. "Open with" and "Share" give the decrypted bytes to the receiving app, which could keep a copy. Exported files are plaintext. Links to shared files survive an automatic lock for up to 30 minutes, so a player or upload can finish. They end on "Lock now" or when the screen turns off. Passwords typed into the UI pass through immutable strings that can't be wiped from memory. The folder browser needs Android's "All files access" permission.